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IS TEXTUALISM REQUIRED BY 
CONSTITUTIONAL SEPARATION OF 
POWERS? 
Ofer Raban∗ 
This article examines the often-heard claim that textualism 
in statutory interpretation is mandated by constitutional 
separation of powers. The claim is examined using both the 
formalist and the functionalist approaches to separation of 
powers doctrine under the Federal Constitution. As we 
shall see, these doctrinal inquiries quickly devolve into 
examinations of the purposes and justification of textualism, 
and of separating the three branches of government. The 
article concludes not only that standing constitutional 
doctrine fails to support the textualist claim, but also that, 
as a matter of fact, textualism is a judicial philosophy that 
runs counter to the most basic principles of constitutional 
separation of powers.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Advocates of textualism have long claimed that textualism is 
mandated by constitutional separation of powers.1 Simply put, the 
argument alleges that judicial deviations from statutory texts amount 
to legislative amendments that encroach on the power of the 
legislature. This Article is an examination of that claim. It follows 
the accepted division of constitutional separation of powers doctrine 
into a formalist and a functionalist approach, beginning with the 
former.  
The Article concludes that the textualist claim is untenable 
under both approaches: non-textualist statutory interpretation is in 
perfect agreement with the best understanding of standing separation 
of powers doctrine. In fact, as we shall see, the claim that  
non-textualism is unconstitutional, and that textualism is the way to 
go, is—paradoxically—in direct conflict with the most basic 
objectives of constitutional separation of powers. 
II.  THE FORMALIST APPROACH 
A.  The Formalist Methodology 
Commentators classify Supreme Court separation of powers 
precedents into two categories: those employing a formalist 
approach, and those employing a functionalist approach.2 Formalist 
opinions begin by classifying some government action as legislative, 
executive, or judicial, and proceed by examining whether the 
challenged action was performed by the appropriate branch. INS v. 
Chadha,3 which invalidated the so-called legislative veto, and 
Clinton v. City of New York,4 which invalidated the presidential 
 
 1. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2505 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Cameron 
v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 718 N.W.2d 784 (Mich. 2006), overruled by Regents of the Univ. of 
Mich. v. Titan Ins. Co., 791 N.W.2d 897 (Mich. 2010), overruled by Joseph v. Auto Club Ins. 
Ass’n, 815 N.W.2d 412 (Mich. 2012); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: 
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS xxvii–xxx (2012); John F. Manning, Textualism as a 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ 
Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983). 
 2. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Comment, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton, 109 HARV. L. REV. 78, 91–101 (1995); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional 
Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 
488, 488–94 (1987) (rejecting formalism in favor of functionalism for the administrative levels of 
government). 
 3. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 4. 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
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budgetary line-item veto, are two paradigmatic examples of the 
formalist approach.5  
In Chadha, the Supreme Court invalidated a statutory provision 
that allowed one house of Congress to cancel an executive decision-
exempting individual from deportation.6 Chadha, a Kenyan national 
who graduated from an American medical school, was granted an 
exemption from deportation by the executive branch, in accordance 
with that statutory provision.7 But the House of Representatives, 
exercising its own prerogative under that same statute, voted to 
cancel the exemption.8 Chadha then challenged the legislative 
cancelation of his exemption as a violation of constitutional 
separation of powers. The Supreme Court agreed.9 The cancelation, 
said the Court, was legislative in nature. But legislative actions can 
be taken, per Article I of the Constitution, only with the consent of 
both houses of Congress and the possibility of a presidential veto—
whereas here the action was taken, in accordance with the statutory 
provision, only by the House of Representatives, and without 
presentment to the president.10 
In Clinton, the Supreme Court invalidated a statute that allowed 
the president to cancel specific items of discretionary spending 
enacted by Congress, if the president found that the cancelation met 
certain specified conditions.11 The Court held that such line-item 
cancelations were legislative in nature since the president was, in 
effect, making changes to legislative enactments.12 The president was 
therefore exercising legislative power, in violation of constitutional 
separation of powers.13 
Thus, in both cases, the Court began by identifying an action as 
legislative in nature, and then declared that such action must be 
exercised by the legislative branch, and in accordance with the 
 
 5. Compare Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), and Chadha, 462 U.S. at 919 
(formalist cases), with Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), and Morrison v. Olson, 
487 U.S. 654 (1988) (functionalist cases). 
 6. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 928. 
 7. Id. at 923–25. 
 8. Id. at 926–27. 
 9. Id. at 928. 
 10. Id. at 945–59. 
 11. These conditions were “(i) reduce the Federal budget deficit; (ii) not impair any essential 
Government functions; and (iii) not harm the national interest.” Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C. 
§ 691 (1994), invalidated by Clinton v. City of N.Y., 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
 12. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438–41. 
 13. Id. at 448–49. 
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legislative procedures specified in the constitution. The formalist 
approach therefore presupposes that the three branches of 
government engage in essentially different sorts of action.  
That presupposition has been subjected to some scorching 
criticism.14 There are, of course, paradigmatic examples of 
legislative, executive, and judicial actions: defining criminal offenses 
is a paradigmatic example of legislative power, just as prosecuting 
those who committed them is quintessentially executive, and 
deciding their guilt or innocence is a clear judicial function. But 
separation of power cases rarely present such neatly packaged 
questions: most cases present some midway function whose 
classification is uncertain (as in Chadha and Clinton). Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has failed to formulate definitions that could 
distinguish among purported legislative, executive, and judicial 
actions. In Chadha, for example, the Court declared that the one-
house veto was “legislative” because legislative actions were those 
that “had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, 
and relations of persons . . . .”15 But surely executive and judicial 
actions also have the “purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, 
duties, and relations of persons.” Indeed while the Chadha majority 
claimed that Congress’ action in the case was legislative in nature, a 
concurring opinion claimed that it was in fact judicial in nature, 
because “[t]he House did not enact a general rule” but instead made 
specific determinations under an existing legal standard.16 In fact, it 
may be just as reasonable to regard Congress’ action as executive in 
nature, since it dealt with the execution of an immigration law vis-à-
vis a particular individual.17 
Notwithstanding this potentially devastating criticism, the 
formalist approach to separation of powers is alive and well, and our 
doctrinal examination of the textualist claim begins with it. 
 
 14. See, e.g., Chadha, 462 U.S. at 998–1002 (White, J., dissenting); Plaut v. Spendthrift 
Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 221, 258 n.10 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Strauss, supra note 22, at 
488–94. 
 15. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952. 
 16. Id. at 964–65 (Powell, J., concurring) (“On its face, the House’s action appears clearly 
adjudicatory. The House did not enact a general rule; rather it made its own determination that six 
specific persons did not comply with certain statutory criteria. It thus undertook the type of 
decision that traditionally has been left to other branches. Even if the House did not make a de 
novo determination, but simply reviewed the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s findings, 
it still assumed a function ordinarily entrusted to the federal courts.”). 
 17. It was also argued in the case that the executive’s grant of exemption from deportation 
was a form of “lawmaking.” Id. at 956. 
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B.  The Formalist Approach and Textualism 
 The formalist textualist argument is based on the claim that 
non-textualist statutory interpretation is, in essence, legislative in 
nature. Since the Supreme Court has so far failed to offer persuasive 
definitions separating legislative from judicial actions, support for 
that claim must come from some larger thesis about the difference 
between legislative and judicial functions. That thesis proceeds as 
follows: In a democracy, policy decisions are properly made by 
representatives of the people elected in free periodic elections. These 
elected representatives reduce their policy decisions into statutory 
texts. When judges follow those texts, they therefore follow the 
policy decisions of the legislature. But when judges deviate from a 
statutory text, they essentially replace that statute with a different 
one—because the decision now accords with a differently worded 
statute, rather than with the words approved by the legislature. 
Whenever a judge renders a decision that fails to accord with the text 
of a statute, she is engaged in legislative action because, in practical 
terms, she is rewriting the law. 
But the argument, as it stands, is clearly insufficient: the 
argument begs the question by assuming that statutory law is nothing 
more than statutory text (and that judges therefore change statutory 
law whenever they deviate from the statutory text). Not so, say many 
legal theorists: statutory law consists of much more than the texts of 
statutes. It also consists of legislative purpose, which can trump and 
override statutory language; of some background morality, or equity, 
which judges must take into account when deciding what statutes 
actually require; or of the factual assumptions underlying the 
statutory enactment, so that a change in those circumstances may 
bring about a change in the statutory requirements even as the text 
remains unchanged.18 There are other factors, above and beyond the 
mere literal text, that go into determining what a statute requires. 
And this means that judges who fail to follow a statutory text do not 
necessarily amend or rewrite the law; to the contrary—sometimes 
they may have to deviate from the statutory text in order to follow 
the statute. 
 
 18. See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); United States v. Seeger, 380 
U.S. 163 (1965); Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892); United States v. 
Kirby, 74 U.S. 482 (1868); People v. Ford, 128 N.E. 479 (Ill. 1920). 
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This debate between textualists and non-textualists is a subset of 
a larger debate about the nature of law—a long-standing dispute that 
implicates fundamental philosophical questions, including questions 
about the nature of truth itself (including whether moral reasoning 
can be true or false19). The claim that non-textualist statutory 
interpretation amounts to amending statutory law therefore relies on 
a complicated, wide-ranging, and deeply controversial philosophical 
argument. Unsurprisingly, I will not attempt to tackle this argument 
here; but I mention its complexity in order to point to the scale of the 
challenge facing the textualists’ doctrinal claim. Constitutional 
separation of powers doctrine may, of course, revolve around deep 
and contentious theoretical questions; constitutional doctrines 
sometimes do. Still, a controversial, complicated, sometimes abstruse 
(and, in my opinion, utterly misguided) theoretical thesis certainly 
makes for a challenging argument. 
In any event, the characterization of non-textual judicial 
reasoning as a form of legislation—i.e., the claim that judges either 
follow statutory texts to a ‘T,’ or else usurp legislative power—takes 
an astoundingly expansive view of what counts as “legislation” for 
purposes of constitutional separation of powers. The textualist claim 
regards as “legislative” any judicial deviation from the literal 
statutory text in the name of such time-honored judicial 
considerations as legislative intent, the coherence of the law, 
fairness, equity, or the expected consequences of the decision.20 But 
there seem to be enormous differences between such non-textual 
interpretation and legislative policy-making.21 Unlike legislators—
 
 19. See generally, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (2011) (where 
Dworkin undertakes the philosophical debate between moral realism and anti-realism, to which 
he was led in defense of his theory of law). 
 20. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319 (1989); 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007 
(1989) [hereinafter Eskridge, Public Values]; Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and 
Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281 (1989); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and 
Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353 (1989); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory 
Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of 
Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541 (1988); William N. Eskridge Jr., Dynamic 
Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987) [hereinafter Eskridge, Dynamic 
Statutory Interpretation]; Dennis M. Patterson, Interpretation in Law—Toward a Reconstruction 
of the Current Debate, 29 VILL. L. REV. 671 (1984). 
 21. For further elaboration of this claim, see, e.g., Ofer Raban, Real and Imagined Threats to 
the Rule of Law: On Brian Tamanaha’s Law as Means to an End, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 478 
(2008); Ofer Raban, The Supreme Court’s Endorsement of a Politicized Judiciary: A 
Philosophical Critique, 8 J. L. SOC’Y 114 (2007); Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 
supra note 2020; Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 
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who simply opt for what they consider the best course of action—
judges must have principled explanations, grounded in the relevant 
legal materials; and their decisions must be consistent with the 
purported policy determinations of the legislature, and also with past 
judicial decisions on the matter. Indeed judges are often led to 
conclusions that are diametrically opposed to their own personal 
policy choices. (For example, it would be odd to regard Chief Justice 
John Roberts’ non-textualist opinion in King v. Burwell22—which 
saved the Affordable Care Act from practical demise—as a judicial 
policy choice, given that Roberts is, in all likelihood, a staunch 
policy opponent of the Affordable Care Act.23) But if you do not buy 
the idea that judicial reasoning amounts to the exercise of policy-
making powers, you also do not buy the textualists’ formalist 
separation of powers argument—because that is its crux. 
Moreover, the formalist argument has at least two additional 
formidable obstacles: first, the undeniable fact that non-textualism is 
commonly practiced by American courts, including the U.S. 
Supreme Court; and second, the equally unsurprising fact that non-
textualist statutory interpretation has been validated by a number of 
related constitutional doctrines. 
1.  Supreme Court Practice 
Actual government practices are given great deference in 
separation of powers cases: “we put significant weight upon 
historical practice,” declared the Supreme Court in a separation of 
powers challenge.24 Indeed, a long line of separation of powers cases 
recognizes that “traditional ways of conducting government . . . give 
meaning to the Constitution,”25 and “longstanding ‘practice of the 
 
HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958). But see, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND 
DEMOCRACY 63 (2003) (“Pragmatism may tend to dissolve law into policy analysis . . . .”) 
(arguing that while judges are duty-bound to consider non-textual considerations, their decisions 
do amount to legislative policy-making). Posner does not think this presents a violation of 
constitutional separation of powers. 
 22. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 23. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577, 2579 (2012) (Roberts, 
J., concurring in part) (“We do not consider whether the [Affordable Care Act] embodies sound 
policies. That judgment is entrusted to the Nation’s elected leaders . . . . Members of this Court 
are vested with the authority to interpret the law; we possess neither the expertise nor the 
prerogative to make policy judgments.”). 
 24. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 25. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 400–01 (1989) (“While these extrajudicial 
activities spawned spirited discussion and frequent criticism, and although some of the judges 
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government . . .’ can inform our determination of ‘what the law 
is.’”26 And “[t]hese precedents show that this Court has treated 
practice as an important interpretive factor even when the nature or 
longevity of that practice is subject to dispute, and even when that 
practice began after the founding era.”27 
As regarding non-textualist judicial practice, let us postulate that 
the vast majority of statutory cases reach conclusions that accord 
with statutory texts. But this does not mean that the vast majority of 
statutory cases employ a textualist methodology. Indeed as soon as 
courts take into account something other than the statutory text in 
cases where that text is clear and determinate—as they practically 
always do—they are no longer engaged in a textualist interpretation. 
Thus, courts’ conclusions often accord with the literal text for 
reasons that go well beyond that text (including the conclusion that 
legislative intent also calls for that result—indeed it is only to be 
expected that the statutory text and the legislative intent would go 
hand-in-hand in most cases.) 
However, since it is preferable to make a point with the 
strongest evidence possible, the following are three recent U.S. 
Supreme Court cases that not only engaged in non-textualist 
reasoning, but also reached conclusions that, in fact, were clearly at 
odds with the literal statutory texts. 
Hamilton v. Lanning28 involved the statutory formula for 
calculating debtors’ future earnings under the federal Bankruptcy 
Act.29 The calculated figure determines debtors’ monthly payments 
when under bankruptcy protection.30 A 2005 amendment to the Code 
specifies that a debtor’s future earning is “the average monthly 
income” during a specified 6-month period.31 The case before the 
Court involved a debtor who received an exceptional one-time 
buyout during that 6-month period. The buyout boosted her expected 
 
who undertook these duties sometimes did so with reservation and may have looked back on their 
service with regret, ‘traditional ways of conducting government . . . give meaning’ to the 
Constitution.”) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 26. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2560. 
 27. Id. (citations omitted). 
 28. 560 U.S. 505 (2010). 
 29. Id. at 508–09 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1306(b), 1321, 1322(a)(1), 1328(a) (2010)). 
 30. See id. at 509. 
 31. Id. at 510 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(10A)(A)–(B)). 
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income under the statutory formula, resulting in a projected monthly 
income that was more than double the actual one.32 
The Supreme Court held that the calculated expected income 
needed to be corrected, notwithstanding the clear statutory language: 
“the method outlined [in the statutory formula] should be 
determinative in most cases,” wrote the Court, “but . . . where 
significant changes in a debtor’s financial circumstances are known 
or virtually certain, a bankruptcy court has discretion to make an 
appropriate adjustment.”33 Justice Scalia, the leading textualist on the 
Supreme Court (and a leading proponent of the textualist separation 
of powers thesis), alone dissented from that decision:34 The Court, he 
wrote, “can arrive at its compromise construction only by rewriting 
the statute.”35 
Scalia also disagreed with the majority’s non-textualist 
interpretation in the recent Bond v. United States,36 which involved a 
criminal prosecution under the Chemical Weapons Convention 
Implementation Act—a federal statute implementing the Chemical 
Weapons Convention in the United States.37 The Act forbids any 
person to “own, possess, or use . . . any chemical weapon[,]”38 
defined as “any chemical which through its chemical action on life 
processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent 
harm to humans or animals.”39 The prosecution involved a domestic 
feud where a microbiologist spread a potentially lethal chemical on 
the car, mailbox, and doorknob of her husband’s lover.40 
A majority of the Court held that the statute did not apply to this 
domestic dispute. According to the opinion, Congress could not have 
intended to regulate local criminal matters, usually preserved for the 
states, when it implemented an international convention dealing with 
chemical warfare.41 Thus, notwithstanding the clear statutory 
 
 32. Id. at 511. 
 33. Id. at 513. 
 34. See id. at 524–32 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that a “mechanical” application of 
the statute is the way to go). 
 35. Id. at 527. 
 36. 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014) (joined by two other justices). 
 37. Id. at 2083. 
 38. 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1) (2012). 
 39. Id. § 229F(8)(A). 
 40. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2085. 
 41. See id. at 2090–93. 
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language, the statute was not violated.42 Justice Scalia denounced the 
Court’s “result-driven antitextualism:” “It is the responsibility of the 
legislature, not the Court, . . . to define a crime, and ordain its 
punishment . . . . Today, the Court shirks its job and performs 
Congress’s,” he wrote.43 
Finally, King v. Burwell44 involved the Affordable Care Act’s 
healthcare subsidies, which the Act made available to those who 
purchased their health insurance on a “[healthcare] Exchange 
established by the State.”45 The Court held that the IRA properly 
interpreted the Act to provide subsidies also for those who purchased 
their insurance in exchanges established by the federal government. 
The Court reasoned that, notwithstanding the seemingly clear 
statutory language, other sections of the law cast doubt on the 
assertion that the provision meant what it seemed to say: “when 
deciding whether the language is plain, the Court must read the 
words in their context with a view to their place in the overall 
statutory scheme.”46 The provision was therefore “ambiguous.”47 
The Court then resolved the ambiguity against the statutory language 
by relying on the legislative purpose of the Affordable Care Act.48 
Justice Scalia’s dissent accused the majority of a violation of 
constitutional separation of powers: 
[The Court’s judicial] philosophy ignores the American 
people’s decision to give Congress “[a]ll legislative 
Powers” enumerated in the Constitution. Art. I, § 1. They 
made Congress, not this Court, responsible for both making 
laws and mending them. This Court holds only the judicial 
power—the power to pronounce the law as Congress has 
enacted it.49 
For the majority, this was just another day at the office. 
Notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s recurrent separation of powers 
claims, the dominant American practice of statutory interpretation is, 
 
 42. Id. at 2089 (“‘[I]t is incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain of Congress’ intent 
before finding that federal law overrides’ the ‘usual constitutional balance of federal and state 
powers.’” (citations omitted)). 
 43. Id. at 2094–95 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 44. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 45. Id. at 2482 (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 18031). 
 46. Id. at 2483 (citations omitted). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 2496. 
 49. Id. at 2505. 
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and always has been, non-textualist.50 Given this brute fact, and the 
significance of actual practices for separation of power questions, it 
is hard to see how non-textualism can be considered improper. 
2.  Precedent 
One would expect constitutional doctrine to reflect the fact that 
non-textualism is the dominant judicial practice; and it does. There 
is, of course, no direct constitutional ruling dealing with the 
constitutionality of non-textualist statutory interpretation; but there 
are a number of constitutional precedents that engage the subject 
indirectly. These include important constitutional doctrines dealing 
with statutory interpretation on the part of administrative agencies, as 
well as cases grappling with the retroactive application of criminal 
statutes. 
a.  Administrative Law 
Administrative agencies regularly interpret and apply statutes, 
and their interpretations are often challenged in the courts. The 
Supreme Court’s principal test for the validity of those 
interpretations was announced in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.51 Under Chevron, a reviewing court 
must first determine whether the relevant statute governs the matter 
at hand unambiguously.52 If it does not, the agency’s interpretation 
must be given deference.53 
Ambiguity, however, is not a function of statutory language but 
of Congressional intent: “[courts] must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress,” declared the Chevron 
opinion.54 And intent may or may not be fully captured by the 
statutory text: “[s]ometimes the legislative delegation to an agency 
on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit.”55 Indeed, the 
Court was “not persuaded that parsing of general terms in the text of 
the statute will reveal an actual intent of Congress.”56 Instead, 
Chevron calls for a comprehensive analysis that employs the 
“traditional tools of statutory construction”—including a review of 
 
 50. See, e.g., ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014). 
 51. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 52. Id. at 842. 
 53. See id. at 843–44. 
 54. Id. at 843 (emphasis added). 
 55. Id. at 844. 
 56. Id. at 861. 
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legislative history (a known anathema for textualists57)—when 
ascertaining Congress’ intent.58 
Subsequent decisions demonstrated the extent to which statutory 
language can at times be disregarded in proper statutory 
interpretation. In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. the 
Court held that the Food and Drug Administration wrongly 
interpreted a statute authorizing it to regulate “drugs” and “devices” 
as authority to regulate cigarettes.59 The statute defined drugs as 
“articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any 
function of the body.”60 It defined “a device” to include “an 
instrument, apparatus, implement . . . intended to affect the structure 
or any function of the body.”61 And the statute explicitly granted the 
FDA the authority to regulate so-called “combination products,” 
which “constitute a combination of a drug, device, or biological 
product.”62 Acting in reliance of the statutory text, the FDA 
classified cigarettes as devices for the delivery of the drug nicotine, 
and claimed power to regulate them.63 Yet, despite the unambiguous 
statutory text, the Court refused to recognize an unambiguous grant 
of regulative power. And it then went further and held that, in fact, 
Congress unambiguously withheld such regulatory power from the 
FDA: “It is . . . clear, based on the FDCA’s overall regulatory 
scheme and the subsequent tobacco legislation, that Congress has 
directly spoken to the question at issue and precluded the FDA from 
regulating tobacco products.”64 Thus, Congress has precluded the 
FDA from regulating tobacco products when, in “subsequent tobacco 
legislation,” it expressed its intent to allow the market in cigarettes.65 
Indeed if the FDA had the power to regulate cigarettes, reasoned the 
Court, it would be obligated to ban them, because it was statutorily 
obligated to certify products as “safe” before allowing their sale.66 
Thus, allowing the FDA to regulate cigarettes would have 
 
 57. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 29–37 (Amy Gutman et al. 
eds., 1998). 
 58. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9; see United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 
392–93 (1999); Holly Farms Corp. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 517 U.S. 392, 398–99 (1996). 
 59. 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000). 
 60. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (2012). 
 61. Id. § 321(h). 
 62. Id. § 353(g)(1). 
 63. Brown & Williamson Corp., 529 U.S. at 127. 
 64. Id. at 160. 
 65. Id. at 137 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 1311(a)). 
 66. Id. at 136. 
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contradicted Congress’ unambiguous intent to allow the market in 
cigarettes, even though the statutory language supported that 
regulative power.67  
Admittedly, subsequent decisions were not always consistent on 
this subject—and for an obvious reason: the same Justice who 
claimed that nontextualism was a violation of constitutional 
separation of powers also sought to inject textualism into this area of 
the law. Justice Scalia joined the Supreme Court in 1986, two years 
after Chevron was decided.68 A year later he was already pushing for 
a textualist reorientation of Chevron.69 As more conservative justices 
joined the Court, Scalia’s efforts bore more fruit. Although never 
entirely successful (the Supreme Court never repudiated Chevron’s 
focus on legislative intent), Scalia’s advocacy produced more and 
more cases where Chevron’s first step (determining whether 
Congress addressed the matter at hand unambiguously) was 
measured by the clarity of the statutory text. In Yellow 
Transportation, Inc. v. Michigan,70 for example, the Court described 
Chevron’s first step as “the question . . . whether the text of the 
statute resolves the issue.”71 
At the same time, however—and arguably precisely because of 
this textualist reorientation of Chevron—the Court reintroduced a 
non-textual focus on congressional intent via a new preliminary step 
(dubbed Chevron’s “step zero”) which asks whether the Chevron 
analysis should apply at all.72 The question is whether “Congress 
intended [administrative ruling in this area] to carry the force of 
law . . . .”73 If Congress did not have such intention, the validity of 
the agency’s interpretation does not receive Chevron deference, and 
is measured, instead, via (non-textualist) considerations that include 
“the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and 
 
 67. For other examples of non-textualist statutory interpretations in the context of 
administrative law, see Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006), and Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Nat. 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985). 
 68. Biography of Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographyScalia.aspx (last visited Jan 7, 2016). 
 69. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 454 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 70. 537 U.S. 36 (2002). 
 71. Id. at 45; see Linda Jellum, The Impact of the Rise and Fall of Chevron on the 
Executive’s Power to Make and Interpret Law, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141, 173–74 (2012); Linda 
Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to Senescence, 4 ADMIN. L. REV. 
725, 761–71 (2007). 
 72. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006). 
 73. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001). 
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relative expertness, and . . . the persuasiveness of the agency’s 
position.”74 (Indeed King v. Burwell, discussed above as an example 
of the U.S. Supreme Court’s anti-textualism, was also a non-
textualist Chevron Step Zero case.75) 
In short, Supreme Court reviews of agencies’ statutory 
interpretations recognize that the validity of such interpretations does 
not depend on fidelity to statutory texts. Moreover, although 
Chevron itself did not even mention constitutional separation of 
powers, the decision is certainly about the separation of powers 
among the legislature (Congress), the executive (administrative 
agencies), and the courts—and is regularly discussed in the literature 
as a decision dealing with constitutional separation of powers.76 
b.  The Due Process Clause 
The Constitution’s two Ex Post Facto clauses forbid the federal 
government and the states to impose criminal punishment on acts 
committed before the criminal punishment at issue was enacted.77 
But the Ex Post Facto clauses apply only to the legislature (they 
prohibit the “pass[ing]” of Ex Post Facto laws).78 Accordingly, the 
Supreme Court developed a Due Process doctrine that prohibits the 
retroactive application of judicial decisions.79 Just as the Ex Post 
Facto clauses forbid the imposition of criminal sanctions on acts 
committed before the enactment of that criminal penalty, so does the 
Due Process Clause forbid judicial imposition of criminal sanctions 
through a novel judicial interpretation announced after the conduct 
had occurred.80 Thus, this Due Process doctrine draws a distinction 
between judicial interpretations that merely apply a pre-existing 
statute, and interpretations that amount to something like novel 
 
 74. Id. at 228. 
 75. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). The Court explained its refusal to apply a 
Chevron analysis by stating that “[i]t is especially unlikely that Congress would have delegated 
this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy of this sort.” 
Id. at 2489. 
 76. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 
SUP. CT. REV. 201 (2001); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to 
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996). 
 77. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9–10 (“No . . . ex post facto Law shall be passed . . . . No state 
shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto law . . . .”). 
 78. Id. 
 79. E.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353–54 (1964). 
 80. Id. 
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legislation—the same distinction that, according to the textualist 
separation of power thesis, revolves around fidelity to statutory texts. 
But this Due Process doctrine does not revolve around textual 
fidelity. Instead, the doctrine draws the distinction by asking whether 
the application of the statute is “unexpected and indefensible by 
reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in 
issue.”81 And “the law” is “expressed” not only in the statutory text 
but also in any previous decision applying that text, whether that 
decision did or did not faithfully follow the text.82 Only if a criminal 
sanction is “clearly at variance with the statutory language” and “has 
not the slightest support in prior . . . decisions” is it barred from 
retroactive application.83 A less inclusive standard, said the Supreme 
Court, “would place an unworkable and unacceptable restraint on 
normal judicial processes . . . .”84 
Lower court decisions demonstrate that judicial interpretations 
that deviate from the statutory language can be applied retroactively. 
Niederstadt v. Nixon,85 for example, dealt with the application of 
Missouri’s sodomy statute, which criminalized “intercourse . . . by 
the use of forcible compulsion.”86 The statute defined “forcible 
compulsion” as “[p]hysical force that overcomes reasonable 
resistance.”87 Notwithstanding this clear statutory language, the 
Missouri Supreme Court held that the term “forcible compulsion” 
also included the penetration of a sleeping victim who (for obvious 
 
 81. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 457 (2001). 
 82. See id. at 457–58. 
 83. See Bouie, 378 U.S. at 356–57 (Accordingly, Bouie relied on the fact that previous 
“cases construing the statute” had not given the “slightest indication” that the statute meant what 
the new interpretation said that it did.); see also United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) 
(“[D]ue process bars courts from applying a novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct 
that neither the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its scope.”). 
 84. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 461. The Rogers decision added: “That is particularly so where, as 
here, the allegedly impermissible judicial application of a rule of law involves not the 
interpretation of a statute but an act of common law judging”—thus making clear that its concern 
with “unworkable and unacceptable restraint on normal judicial processes” encompassed 
statutory interpretation as well. Our separation of powers inquiry, of course, is restricted to 
statutory interpretation (regarding which textualism stakes its claims), not with common law 
decision-making. 
 85. 505 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 86. Id. at 834. 
 87. Id. (“Niederstadt was charged with sodomy in violation of § 566.060(1). The statute 
prohibited ‘deviate sexual intercourse with another person without that person’s consent by the 
use of forcible compulsion.’ It is conceded that Niederstadt’s digital penetration constituted 
‘deviate sexual intercourse’ as defined in § 566.010(1). As relevant here, ‘forcible compulsion’ 
was defined as ‘[p]hysical force that overcomes reasonable resistance.’”). 
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reasons) did not resist.88 The decision was challenged as a retroactive 
application forbidden by the Due Process Clause, but the Eighth 
Circuit rejected the challenge: this (non-textualist) interpretation of 
the sodomy statute, reasoned the court, did not “change the law,” 
because the decision conformed with “common sense,” and because 
older case law dealing with a related offense (and predating the 
applicable statute) also found forcible compulsion where a sleeping 
victim was penetrated.89 
To summarize, there is no proper definition of judicial action 
that leaves non-textualism out; the philosophical argument to that 
effect is problematic and unconvincing; and precedents dealing with 
administrative agencies’ statutory interpretation and with the 
application of criminal statutes demonstrate the validity—indeed the 
correctness—of non-textual statutory interpretations. These facts 
reflect a simple truth that even the textualists do not deny: non-
textualist statutory interpretation is common judicial practice in the 
United States, not the least on the U.S. Supreme Court itself. And 
given the importance of customary conduct for separation of powers 
cases, it is simply difficult to imagine how non-textualist 
interpretation could ever be regarded as legislative rather than 
judicial action. The formalist approach to constitutional separation of 
powers cannot support the textualist separation of powers argument. 
But the functionalist approach offers even less help. 
III.  THE FUNCTIONALIST APPROACH 
A.  The Functionalist Methodology 
Recall that in Chadha, the Justices divided over the nature of the 
Congressional action at issue in the case. The majority claimed that it 
was legislative action, whereas a concurring opinion claimed that it 
was judicial in nature. That concurring opinion went on to make the 
following remark: “The Court concludes that Congress’ action was 
legislative in character . . . . But reasonable minds may disagree over 
the character of an act[,] and the more helpful inquiry, in my view, is 
 
 88. Id. at 835. 
 89. Id. at 837–39 (“This historical review makes crystal clear what common sense teaches—
it was neither unexpected nor indefensible for the Supreme Court of Missouri to construe the 
Missouri rape and sodomy statutes in effect when Niederstadt committed his offense as applying 
to the unconsented penetration of a sleeping woman . . . .”). 
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whether the act in question raises the dangers the Framers sought to 
avoid.”90 
This is the gist of the functionalist approach. The approach 
recognizes that the three branches necessarily partake in actions that 
cannot be neatly separated into distinct conceptual categories, and 
that practical necessities often require overlaps of function. Thus, 
instead of seeking to classify actions into legislative, executive, or 
judicial in nature—often something of a fool’s errand—the 
functionalist approach revolves around the purposes of separating the 
government into three separate branches. It asks not what is the 
nature of the challenged action, but whether that action conflicts with 
the purposes of separating the power of government into three 
separate branches. 
The main purpose behind constitutional separation of powers is 
the prevention of tyranny and oppression, which it seeks to achieve 
by preventing excessive concentration of power.91 The idea is 
simple: separating powers makes it more difficult to exercise power, 
and hence more difficult to abuse it. If the same government entity 
could define criminal offenses, investigate and prosecute potential 
offenders, and then determine their innocence or guilt, the potential 
for oppression and abuse would be exponentially greater than if 
separate bodies were responsible for each of those steps. 
A secondary purpose sometimes mentioned in the literature is 
the interest in institutional specialization and efficiency: assigning 
different functions to different branches of government promotes 
expertise, as institutions become more adept at performing their 
assigned tasks.92 Separating the powers therefore assures that 
decisions are made by the institution most suitable for making 
them.93 (This secondary purpose, however, may sometimes collide 
 
 90. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 964 n.7 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 91. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (Jacob Ernest Cooke ed., 1961) 
(“The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether 
of one, a few or may, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be 
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”). 
 92. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 423, 
443 (1987) (“Even though the distribution of national power can be understood as an efficient 
division of labor, the best-known justification for the distribution is the need to diminish the risk 
of tyranny.”). 
 93. See Letter from John Adams to Richard Henry Lee, NAT’L ARCHIVES (Nov. 15, 1775), 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-03-02-0163 (“A [l]egislative, an [e]xecutive 
and a judicial [p]ower comprehend the whole of what is meant and understood by [g]overnment. 
It is by balancing each of these [p]owers against the other two, that the [e]fforts in human [n]ature 
towards [t]yranny can alone be checked and restrained . . . .”); see, e.g., Bruce G. Peabody & John 
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with the primary focus of the separation of powers requirement: 
preventing excessive concentration of power may come at the cost of 
decreased efficiency.94) 
When applying the functionalist approach to Chadha, for 
example, the principal question would be whether the challenged 
action (here, the House of Representatives’ invalidation of an 
executive exemption from deportation) is a Congressional power-
grab that risks excessive concentration of power in the legislature. 
The dissenters in Chadha (who, unlike the majority, opted for the 
functionalist approach) thought that the answer was clearly “no.” 
After all, Congress was under no obligation to allow the executive to 
grant exemptions from deportation to begin with. Congress was 
presumably willing to grant that privilege to the executive under the 
condition that it, Congress, reserved the right to step in and revoke 
any unwarranted use of it.95 Thus, far from aggrandizing the power 
of the legislature, the one-house veto mechanism allowed Congress 
to share its power with the executive.96 The dissenters therefore 
concluded that there was no violation of constitutional separation of 
powers. 
B.  The Functionalist Approach and Textualism 
Ab initio, the functionalist approach appears far less 
accommodating to the claim that non-textualist interpretation is in 
violation of the Constitution. After all, functionalism is based on the 
recognition that no clear lines separate executive, legislative, and 
judicial actions—or, as a Supreme Court case once put it, that all 
three branches “exercise, in some respects, functions in their nature 
executive, legislative and judicial.”97 (It is no coincidence that 
Justice Antonin Scalia, the leading advocate of that claim on the 
 
D. Nugent, Toward a Unifying Theory of the Separation of Powers, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 12 
(2003) (“[T]he dominant view holds that [separation of powers was] intended to serve the 
‘negative’ purpose of creating multiple and mutual checks to avoid the tyrannical accumulations 
of power.”); Sunstein, supra note 92, at 432−33; Sullivan, supra note 22, at 93. 
 94. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to 
promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid 
friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental 
powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.”). 
 95. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 968–74 (White, J., dissenting). 
 96. See id. at 968. 
 97. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 386 (1989) (quoting Myers v. United States, 
272 U.S. 52 (1926)). 
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Court, is also a proponent of the formalist approach.98) Proclaiming 
that non-textualist interpretation is ‘legislative in nature’ therefore 
makes little impression on the functionalist approach. What the 
functionalist approach requires is some demonstration that non-
textualist interpretation concentrates excessive power in the 
judiciary—or, as a less forceful alternative, that non-textualism falls 
outside the usual expertise or know-how of the judicial branch. 
These are difficult claims to sustain. As an initial matter, the 
claim that the American judiciary is unsuitable for non-textualist 
interpretation as a matter of institutional specialization is highly 
improbable: if anything, American judges are the foremost experts in 
developing the law by applying its principles and purposes, rather 
than blindly following a text (an interpretive approach that resonates 
more with the ethos of European civil law99). Non-textualist statutory 
interpretation is the traditional judicial practice inherited from the 
English common law. 
The textualist claim, it seems, must stand or fall with the central 
purpose of constitutional separation of powers: preventing excessive 
concentration of power in one branch of government. But the claim 
that non-textualist statutory interpretation usurps the role of the 
legislature clashes with the fact that deviations from statutory texts 
are almost always justified by reference to legislative purpose or 
intent—that is, by a purported deference to the power of the 
legislature. 
Take the three cases discussed above—Hamilton v. Lanning, 
Bond v. United States, and King v. Burwell—where the U.S. 
Supreme Court reached statutory conclusions that were at odds with 
the statutory language.100 In Hamilton, the Court concluded that 
Congress could not have intended that a person be deprived of 
bankruptcy protection simply because of a fluke—i.e., because she 
just happened to receive a one-time payment during the statutory 
calculation period.101 In enacting the Bankruptcy Act, reasoned the 
Court, Congress evidenced the intent to allow debtors to manage 
 
 98. E.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 413 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 
697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 99. Although, one should add, not with actual practice . . . . Even in the Civil Law context, 
literal textualism is, arguably, more honored in the breach. 
 100. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014); King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2014); 
Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505 (2010). 
 101. See Hamilton, 560 U.S. at 519. 
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their debt through bankruptcy protection;102 allowing the textually-
mandated formula to deny that protection for no good reason would 
sabotage Congress’ principal policy choice in enacting the 
Bankruptcy Act.103 In Bond, the Court concluded that Congress 
could not have intended to invade the province of the states and 
regulate local criminal matters when it implemented the Chemical 
Weapons Convention.104 Congress, said the Court, has repeatedly 
shown its disinclination to regulate local criminal matters—which 
are often beyond its constitutional powers anyhow.105 And in 
Burwell, the Court reasoned that not allowing federal subsidies for 
insurance plans purchased on federally established health care 
exchanges would unravel the entire subsidies scheme, in direct 
contradiction of Congress’ policy choice.106 Thus, in all three cases 
the very purpose of deviating from the statutory text was the wish to 
respect legislative power. 
Indeed, statutory language can be at odds with legislative intent 
for many reasons. For one thing, there is simply the ill-conceived or 
unintentionally confusing use of statutory language. This was the 
apparent problem in Burwell.107 Even more common is the failure to 
anticipate circumstances that may make the statutory language 
misfire. This was presumably what happened in both Hamilton 
(where the legislative formula neglected to take into account 
circumstances that could result in an unrealistic calculation), and in 
Bond (where it was not anticipated that the Chemical Weapons 
Convention Implementation Act would be used by a local prosecutor 
filing criminal charges over a domestic dispute). And so, when literal 
enforcement of statutory language results in legal resolutions that 
thwart, obstruct, or directly contradict the policy choices of elected 
representatives, non-textualist interpretation actually increases 
legislative power rather than usurp it.108 
 
 102. See id. at 517–18. 
 103. See id. at 520–21. 
 104. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2083. 
 105. Id. at 2086. 
 106. Id. at 2496. 
 107. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2014); see Robert Pear, Four Words That Imperil 
Health Care Law Were All a Mistake, Writers Now Say, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/26/us/politics/contested-words-in-affordable-care-act-may- 
have-been-left-by-mistake.html. 
 108. For whatever it is worth, it should be noted that any concern over excessive 
concentration of power in the judiciary in statutory matters is mitigated by the fact that final 
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1.  The Debate over Legislative Intent 
Advocates of textualism offer a number of rebuttals. One 
argument disputes the factual accuracy of the non-textualist claim: 
deviations from the statutory text, imply some textualists, more often 
than not do violence to the real legislative intent.109 
This is an empirical claim. It alleges that judges who deviate 
from literal statutory language in order to comply with legislative 
intent are often mistaken in doing so. (If judges were mostly correct, 
conformity with legislative policy choices would only improve by 
non-textualist interpretations.) But why think that judges mostly get 
things wrong? Or that the number of mistakes they make exceeds the 
number of failures to comply with the legislative intent that would 
result from blind textualism? After all, the textualist strategy makes 
no effort to align judicial decisions and legislative policy choices: it 
simply calls for textual fidelity, irrespective of legislative wishes. By 
contrast, an interpretive strategy that consciously seeks to align legal 
outcomes with legislative policy choices would presumably 
maximize the correspondence between these choices and judicial 
rulings.  
It is difficult to see how the claim that judges are usually 
mistaken could be supported. Naturally, practically all decisions 
involving judicial deviations from statutory texts contain detailed 
explanations as to why they accord with the legislative policy choice. 
And the arguments why they don’t have already failed to convince 
the majority of the judges who heard them.  
One possible response is that non-textualists operate in 
professional bad faith: they opt to implement their own preferred 
policies instead of the policies of elected representatives. No doubt, 
some textualists subscribe to this view.110 But the suggestion of bad 
 
authority over statutory law remains with the legislature, which is free to overrule, for all future 
cases, any judicial interpretation with which it disagrees, as it occasionally does. 
 109. See, e.g., Cameron v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n., 718 N.W.2d 784, 799 (Mich. 2006) 
(Markman, J., concurring) (“[W]hat I discern as the principal purpose of the [statute] cannot be 
allowed to trump its actual language. To allow such a result would enable the judge to impose on 
the law his own characterization of its unstated ‘purpose . . . .’”), overruled by Regents of the 
Univ. of Mich. v. Titan Ins. Co., 791 N.W. 2d 897 (Mich. 2010), overruled by Joseph v. Auto 
Club Ins. Ass’n, 815 N.W.2d 412 (Mich. 2012); SCALIA, supra note 57, at 35–36 (“On balance, 
[the use of legislative history] has facilitated rather than deterred decisions that are based upon the 
courts’ policy preferences.”). 
 110. See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1682 (2015) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“A free society, accustomed to electing its rulers, does not much care whether the 
rulers operate through statute and executive order, or through judicial distortion of statute, 
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faith is not the explanation favored by most textualists, and for an 
obvious reason: if the problem is one of judicial bad faith, the 
solution can hardly be textualism. Judicial bad faith may perhaps be 
more visible if textualism were the common method of legal 
interpretation (though how much more is unclear, given common 
disagreements among textualists);111 but textualism offers no remedy 
for deliberate breaches of official duty. In any event, it is highly 
doubtful that American judges regularly betray their professional 
obligations in order to advance their own favorite policies. 
In fact, most textualists object to judicial appeals to legislative 
intent on different grounds: they do not think that judicial decisions 
regularly misidentify the legislative intent, but that there simply is no 
such thing as legislative intent. Justice Scalia’s objections in 
Hamilton, Bond, or Burwell, for example, did not argue that the 
Court was wrong in its identifications of Congress’ policy choices, 
but that no alleged policy choice should be allowed to trump textual 
fidelity.112 This argument is not rooted in the attribution of judicial 
 
executive order, and constitution. The prescription that judges be elected probably springs from 
the people’s realization that their judges can become their rulers . . . .”). 
 111. Compare Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993) (exchanging a firearm for drugs 
falls squarely within the everyday meaning and dictionary definitions of the word “use” in a 
federal statute penalizing the “use” of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime), with id. at 
241 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (The ordinary meaning of the word “use” excludes the exchange of a 
firearm for drugs as the “use” of a firearm under the statute.). 
 112. Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 531–32 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Unable to 
assemble a compelling case based on what the statute says, the Court falls back on the ‘senseless 
results’ it would produce—results the Court ‘do[es] not think Congress intended.’ Even if it were 
true that a ‘mechanical’ reading resulted in undesirable outcomes that would make no difference. 
For even assuming (though I do not believe it) that we could know which results Congress 
thought it was achieving (or avoiding) apart from the only congressional expression of its 
thoughts, the text, those results would be entirely irrelevant to what the statute means.”); see also 
Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2095–96 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[The Court] 
starts with the federalism-related consequences of the statute’s meaning and reasons backwards, 
holding that, if the statute has what the Court considers a disruptive effect on the “federal-state 
balance” of criminal jurisdiction, that effect causes the text, even if clear on its face, to be 
ambiguous . . . . Imagine what future courts can do with that judge-empowering principle: 
Whatever has improbably broad, deeply serious, and apparently unnecessary consequences . . . is 
ambiguous! . . . In this case . . . the ordinary meaning of the term being defined is irrelevant, 
because the statute’s own definition—however expansive—is utterly clear . . . .”); King v. 
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Words no longer have meaning if an 
Exchange that is not established by a State is ‘established by the State.’ It is hard to come up with 
a clearer way to limit tax credits to state Exchanges than to use the words ‘established by the 
State.’ And it is hard to come up with a reason to include the words ‘by the State’ other than the 
purpose of limiting credits to state Exchanges. ‘[T]he plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a 
statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden sense that nothing but the 
exigency of a hard case and the ingenuity and study of an acute and powerful intellect would 
discover.’”). 
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mistakes or bad faith, but in the claim that there is no “legislative 
policy choice” or “legislative intent” to speak of independently of the 
statutory text:113 even if judges operated in perfect good faith, they 
would still impose their own predilections on the law whenever they 
deviated from the statutory text in the name of legislative intent.114 
a.  Messy legislative compromises 
The argument as to why there can be no legislative policy 
choice, or legislative intent—independently of the statutory text—
starts with the proposition that legislative bodies are made out of 
many individual members, each with her own policy choices.115 
Individual legislators vote for bills for many different, sometimes 
contradictory, reasons—sometimes for no reason at all (perhaps their 
party leadership asked them to do so). There is no reliable way either 
to determine these reasons, or to aggregate them into a coherent 
policy choice. Indeed the legislative process—with its manipulable 
agenda-setting (which may change the ensuing statute even as 
legislators’ policy preferences remain fixed), its practice of 
logrolling (‘you’ll roll my log and I’ll roll yours’), and its many 
unprincipled compromises116—may not reflect any rational or 
 
 113. For an examination of judicial bad faith in constitutional cases, see Jack Wade Nowlin, 
Conceptualizing the Dangers of the “Least Dangerous” Branch: A Typology of Judicial 
Constitutional Violation, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1211 (2007). 
 114. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 57, at 17–18 (“Under the . . . self-delusion of pursuing 
unexpressed legislative intents, common-law judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and 
desires . . . .”); see also Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 
863 (1989) (“Now the main danger in judicial interpretation of the Constitution—or, for that 
matter, in judicial interpretation of any law—is that the judges will mistake their own 
predilections for the law . . . . Nonoriginalism, which under one or another formulation invokes 
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very difficult for a person to discern a difference between those political values that he personally 
thinks most important, and those political values that are ‘fundamental to our society.’”). 
 115. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 547 (“Because legislatures comprise many 
members, they do not have ‘intents’ or ‘designs,’ hidden yet discoverable. Each member may or 
may not have a design. The body as a whole, however, has only outcomes . . . . This follows from 
the discoveries of public choice theory. Although legislators have individual lists of desires, 
priorities, and preferences, it turns out to be difficult, sometimes impossible, to aggregate these 
lists into a coherent collective choice.”). 
 116. Some scholars derive these conclusions from Public Choice theory, since a centerpiece 
of that theory is the idea that although individuals are coherent and rational, a collective of 
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DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS (1958); sources cited supra 
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coherent policy determination, only “messy legislative 
compromises.”117 It is a simple consequence of democratic politics, 
say the textualists, that there is no legislative intent or policy choice 
that judges can unearth and rely upon to guide their decisions. 
Deviations from the literal statutory text in the name of legislative 
intent “rest . . . on the assumption that interpretation should proceed 
as if a reasonable person were framing coherent legislative policy. 
But measured against the true workings of the legislative process, 
that is an unreasonably optimistic view.”118 As Justice Scalia once 
put it: “There are pretty absurd statutes out there. That is what you 
get from legislative compromise . . . . Legislation is often the product 
of unseen and unknowable compromise.”119 
The response to the non-textualists is that the assumption of a 
reasonable and coherent legislative policy choice is not a factual one. 
Judicial appeals to legislative intent are not appeals to some 
empirical, psychological fact about why individual legislators voted 
for a particular bill. Such appeals sometimes make use of empirical 
facts (like legislative history, or the statements of the statute’s 
legislative sponsors); but they never wholly depend on such facts, 
and they are not reducible to them. Legislative intent is an idealized 
judicial construction.120 It is what Lon Fuller called “the intention of 
the design.”121 But it is a necessary construction: it is the working 
hypothesis of any statutory construction. Statutory interpretation 
necessarily begins with a conception of a coherent policy choice that 
the statute represents. 
Moreover, these judicial constructions are often 
noncontroversial, even trivial. In Hamilton, for example, the decision 
 
notwithstanding the problems plaguing the combination of voting preferences. See MAXWELL L. 
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subjective legislative intent. We look for a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a reasonable 
person would gather from the text of the law . . . .”). 
 121. LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF THE LAW 86 (1964). 
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hypothesized that the Bankruptcy Act was intended to provide the 
benefits of bankruptcy protection, and that the statutory formula was 
intended to arrive at realistic monthly payments.122 Perhaps the 
Bankruptcy Act was part of some messy legislative deal, and many 
of the legislators who voted for it secretly hoped that no debtor 
would ever enjoy the benefits of bankruptcy protection. Perhaps the 
statutory formula malfunctioned precisely because it was the result 
of some unprincipled and irrational legislative compromise. Perhaps. 
But such legislative facts should not prevent the judiciary from 
inferring some coherent, reasonable policy choice and having it 
guide its statutory interpretation. This is what the Rule of Law is 
about: making sure that legal requirements are not arbitrary or 
irrational, but that their applications are reasonably justified.123 
The textualists respond that, in that case, the concept of 
legislative intent is endlessly manipulable: it simply allows judges to 
follow their own desires.124 Such “judicial construction,” they say, is 
judicial policy-making short and simple; and policy-making is, 
properly speaking, the job of democratically elected representatives. 
Indeed some textualists argue that even when the statutory text leads 
to an unreasonable policy decision, judges must follow it. Justice 
Scalia once praised a 2002 Supreme Court case by remarking that 
“[t]he [legislative] compromise in [the case] was quite absurd—made 
no sense . . .”125 and the result reached by the Supreme Court was 
“certainly absurd as a matter of substance. But we enforced [the 
statute] as written because the text was clear, and we presumed that 
the opposing factions in Congress had bargained for just such a 
result.”126 Congress enacted a statute that was “absurd as a matter of 
substance” and the Court had to take that absurd substance and dish 
it out to the litigants.127 Acting otherwise would have amounted to 
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judicial policymaking. But the judiciary is the wrong branch for 
making policy. 
When the legislature enacts legal requirements that “make no 
sense” or are “absurd,” it does so in accordance with its 
constitutional role. But when judges substitute those absurd policy 
choices for their (albeit sensible) own, they usurp legislative power. 
Frank Easterbrook, a federal appeals court judge, made that point as 
follows: 
The price principals pay for reducing the discretion of their 
agents includes the lost opportunities to carry out the 
principals’ goals in ways the principals could not have 
anticipated when they issued their commands. Yet it is well 
understood that a decision to grant or withhold discretion 
from agents requires a careful balancing of costs. A 
reduction in discretion may mean lost opportunities, but an 
increase in discretion may mean that agents distort or 
deviate from the principals’ plans. The choice between the 
costs of too much and too little discretion properly lies with 
the legislature.128 
According to Easterbrook, the legislature may decide to sacrifice 
the occasional case in order to avoid granting judges discretion in 
applying the statute. Another textualist scholar echoed the claim 
when he wrote: “[E]nforcing the background purpose, rather than the 
details, of a precise text may, in fact, defeat Congress’s evident 
choice to legislate by rule rather than by standard.”129 “[T]he deals 
brokered during a Committee markup, on the floor of the two 
Houses, during a joint House and Senate Conference, or in 
negotiations with the President, . . . are not for us to judge or second-
guess,” declared Justice Scalia.130 If it so wishes, the legislature may, 
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of course, (textually) grant judges the ability to deviate from a 
specified statutory text, or it may use statutory language that leaves 
judges with ample discretion. But to the extent it hasn’t, judges are 
under a strict obligation to follow that language, even when the result 
in the particular case serves no reasonable policy goal. Such are the 
requirements of the Constitution’s separation of powers: judges 
should never be allowed to invent imaginary policy choices and run 
with them. 
In short, textualism’s functionalist separation of powers 
argument boils down to this: judicial deviations from statutory texts 
cannot be justified by appeals to legislative intent, since, as a factual 
matter, such legislative intent does not exist, so that appeals to a 
legislative intent amount to appeals to the judiciary’s own imaginary 
policy choices. Hence, the judicial branch must faithfully follow 
statutory texts—even in cases where these produce results that 
appear to serve no reasonable policy goal. Conversely, judicial 
failures to follow statutory texts constitute judicial usurpation of 
legislative power, and amount to excessive concentration of power in 
the judiciary. 
Is this a convincing claim of unconstitutional concentration of 
power? 
2.  Tyranny 
One problem with the claim that the judiciary must follow 
statutory texts even when the results are senseless or incoherent is 
that separation of powers is ultimately about the prevention of 
tyranny, and, senseless or arbitrary exercises of power are the very 
definition of tyranny.131 Indeed the dictionary defines Tyranny, inter 
alia, as “[u]nreasonable, or arbitrary use of power or control . . .”132 
while “arbitrary,” in turn, means “[b]ased on random choice or 
personal whim, rather than any reason . . . .”133 
Friedrich Hayek, discussing the origins of the Rule of Law and 
the emergence of separation of powers in England, noted that during 
the 17th Century, the prevention of arbitrary action of government 
became a central concern. “[Soon] it came to be realized,” writes 
Hayek, “as Parliament began to act as arbitrarily as the king, that 
whether or not an action was arbitrary depended not on the source of 
 
 131. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra, note 91. 
 132. Tyranny, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). 
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the authority but on whether it was in conformity with pre-existing 
general principles of law.”134 Those “pre-existing general principles 
of law” included precepts like the prohibition on retrospective 
punishments; but mostly, these principles were identified with 
“reason.” Students of jurisprudence are well familiar with Sir 
Edward Coke’s proclamation in 1610 that “when an act of parliament 
is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to 
be performed, the common law will control it, and adjudge such act 
to be void.”135 “Tyranny” consisted in the imposition of unreasonable 
laws; and the imposition of unreasonable laws is precisely what 
separation of powers (and, specifically, judicial independence) came 
to prevent. 
Indeed, complaints about arbitrary and tyrannical abuses of 
power often center around the absence of reasonableness and 
rationality. Consider, for instance, the 2013 New York Times op-ed 
by the Chinese novelist Yu Hua, which contained a litany of 
government abuses of power in China:136 
In late 2010, Chinese customs officials imposed an import 
tax of 1,000 yuan (about $150 then) on every iPad brought 
into the country. Ignoring the fact that iPads differ in 
features and prices, officials set a single tariff: 20 percent of 
the tablet’s listed 5,000-yuan value. People who paid 3,000 
yuan for an iPad in Hong Kong—where smartphones and 
other electronics are much cheaper than on the mainland—
were charged the same tariff. Even Chinese tourists 
returning home with their own iPads, bought in China, were 
taxed! . . . . In 2001, hospital officials in the southern city of 
Shenzhen specified that nurses should show precisely eight 
teeth when smiling. In 2003, Hunan Province, in central 
China, stipulated that the breasts of female candidates for 
civil-service positions should be symmetrical . . . .137 
These laws are tyrannical because they are unreasonable. But then 
again, this is precisely the sort of power that, according to textualists, 
the legislature possesses and the judiciary lacks power to mitigate 
(absent any constitutional violation). And the purported authority for 
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this claim is, perversely enough, the prevention of excessive 
concentration of power. 
3.  Faithful Agency 
The textualist position is in direct conflict with the conventional 
theory of separation of powers for a simpler and a more fundamental 
reason. The textualist usurpation of power thesis boils down to the 
claim that the judiciary is nothing more than the legislature’s faithful 
agent in all matters of statutory interpretation. Unless a statute is 
unconstitutional, separation of powers requires that judges follow 
statutory texts, no matter how unjust or oppressive or counter-
productive or even unreasonable the result might be. 
Far from preventing excessive concentration of power, this 
thesis advocates excessive concentration of power in the legislature. 
But excessive concentration of power in the legislative branch was a 
primary concern of the drafters of the U.S. Constitution. They 
certainly did not think that the judiciary should act as a mere faithful 
agent of the legislature: 
[“T]here is no liberty, if the power of judging be not 
separated from the legislative and executive powers.” . . . 
[F]rom the natural feebleness of the judiciary, it is in 
continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or 
influenced by its co-ordinate branches; . . . [the judiciary is] 
the citadel of the public justice and the public security . . . . 
[I]t is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution 
only, that the independence of the judges may be an 
essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill 
humors in the society. These sometimes extend no farther 
than to the injury of the private rights of particular classes 
of citizens, by unjust and partial laws. Here also the 
firmness of the judicial magistracy is of vast importance in 
mitigating the severity and confining the operation of such 
laws. It not only serves to moderate the immediate 
mischiefs of those which may have been passed, but it 
operates as a check upon the legislative body in passing 
them; who, perceiving that obstacles to the success of 
iniquitous intention are to be expected from the scruples of 
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the courts, are in a manner compelled, by the very motives 
of the injustice they meditate, to qualify their attempts.138 
Alexander Hamilton clearly believed that the judiciary is no 
mere faithful agent of the legislature in matters of statutory 
interpretation. Judges were supposed to mitigate “unjust and partial 
laws,” wrote Hamilton, even when those were not in violation of the 
Constitution. Indeed judges were “the citadel of the public justice”—
and justice was therefore a guiding consideration in their application 
of statutes. In other words, Hamilton thought that the judiciary may 
properly act in contravention of both the statutory text and the 
legislative intent. In fact, this was the whole point of separating their 
powers. 
Consider, for example, the archaic practice of some legislative 
assemblies, in the newly independent American states, to review and 
sometimes overrule judicial decisions.139 That practice—the result of 
lingering suspicion towards courts previously controlled by the 
English Crown—is widely recognized today as a violation of 
constitutional separation of powers, because it concentrates too much 
power in the legislature. But is it also unconstitutional under the 
textualist separation of powers thesis? After all, if the judiciary is 
nothing more than an agent of the legislature, why shouldn’t the 
legislature be able to review and overrule the statutory judgments of 
courts? If judicial power adds nothing to the mix—neither reason nor 
coherence nor justice—nothing seems lost by allowing the legislature 
to act as a court of last resort. Faithful agency is simply at odds with 
our most basic understanding of the purpose and operation of 
constitutional separation of powers. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
James Madison called constitutional separation of powers 
“essential to the preservation of liberty.”140 What he had in mind was 
a constitutional structure that made it difficult to wield the powers 
necessary to tyrannize and oppress. There is little of this in the 
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textualist conception of separation of powers. The central 
preoccupation of the textualist thesis is not concern with excessive 
concentration of power, but concern for the power of legislators and 
their policy-making prerogatives. Textualists seem interested in 
separating the powers of government in order to make sure that 
judicial officials do not assume powers that, they say, properly 
belong to elected representatives. That may be a logical reason for 
separating the powers of government; but it is certainly not the 
theory of separation of powers we find in the Federal Constitution. In 
fact, the textualist thesis puts the Federal Constitution’s separation of 
powers theory on its head: concern over excessive concentration of 
power in the legislature is precisely what brought the framers of the 
Constitution to establish an unelected and independent judiciary. 
Indeed it is difficult to see how fervent defense of representative 
democracy can amount to the constitutional structure we have—
where one branch of government consists of designedly unelected 
officials who are appointed for life. 
This is not an originalist argument: it is a philosophical one. The 
Federal Constitution is rooted in two grand political theories: 
democracy, and political liberalism—the political philosophy 
concerned with the preservation of liberty.141 The impulse behind the 
textualist separation of powers thesis derives, of course, from (a 
version of) democracy. But the Federal Constitution’s separation of 
powers is intended to protect liberalism, not democracy. Indeed it is 
intended to protect liberalism from democracy. That is what’s so 
perverse about the textualist separation of powers thesis: not only is 
it indefensible as a matter of standing constitutional doctrine, it is 
also in direct contradiction with the very purpose of our 
constitutional separation of powers. For it claims for the legislature 
what amounts, in the end, to excessive concentration of power—the 
power to turn another branch of government into its mere agent, and 
the ability to enforce unreasonable and hence tyrannical policies. 
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